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“Pop quiz: what source of power doesn't come out
of the ground, doesn't burn and isn't radioactive?
Hint: it contributed the most new electricity generation
to the U.S. grid in 2008.
The answer is wind power, the technology that
has become synonymous with going green.” (Walsh, 2009)
Purpose
This paper examines the influence of electricity markets and renewable energy
regulations on the growth of wind energy development across the United States from 1994
through 2008.  This time period encompasses the expansion of commercial scale wind
development beyond states such as California, which participated in the nascent wind market in
the 1980s.  Since then wind energy production has grown into a more geographically dispersed
and established industry.  This paper contributes to existing literature on wind development by
providing a theoretical and empirical framework to analyze the combined influence of both
regulatory and market factors.
Other papers have focused on analyzing the efficacy of specific policies regarding
renewable energy development.  Several articles define the basic components of a Renewables
Portfolio Standard (RPS) and include information on the evolution of RPS implementation
across and within states (Langniss and Wiser, 2003; Rader and Norgaard, 1996; Wiser et al,
2007; Wiser and Barbose, 2007; Wiser, Porter, and Grace, 2004; Cory and Swezey, 2007)
Overwhelmingly this literature has argued that RPS are effective in increasing renewables
development.  In addition to the work on RPS, Gouchoe, Everette and Haynes (2002) provide a
case study of ten financial incentives across six states, including a list of recommendations for a
better design of financial incentives.  Their paper uses the same data source, the Database of
State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency  (DSIRE) database, that I use in this analysis.
(DSIRE, db)  An important contribution of my work is the theoretical model and empirical3
analysis of the influence of regulations rather than a descriptive case study of these programs.
Also, much of the existing literature focuses on a short time frame, while this paper includes a
fifteen year time period.
1
In addition to the literature that is focused solely on policy determinants, Bird et al (2005)
provide descriptive work focused on both policy and market factors that are influencing wind
energy development across states.  They argued that state tax and financial incentives along with
RPS are important policies to encourage wind development.  In addition, they contended that
lower costs for wind projects are due in part to technological improvements in wind turbines and
in part to federal tax incentives including the Federal Production Tax Credit (PTC).  They also
maintained that high and volatile natural gas prices have led to increases in wind development by
making wind more cost effective. (Bird et al, 2005, p. 1405)
Menz and Vachon (2006) extended the literature on wind energy development beyond a
descriptive case study approach to an OLS analysis using multiple state policies.  Their cross-
sectional specification covered the time period  from 1998 through 2003 across 39 states and
included a binary indicator for each regulation and a control for wind potential.  Some of their
key findings were that RPS and mandatory green power option programs are positively related to
increases in wind energy development.  My work improves on their empirical analysis because it
includes a panel specification that focuses on states with significant wind energy potential.  I
exclude states that have enacted renewables policies but do not have the resources to develop
wind capacity.
2  Second, by including market controls the role of policies can be analyzed in the
1 Due to limitations on some data a shorter analysis from 1998-2008 was also completed.
2 Due to their limited number of observations, Menz and Vachon (2006) were not able to exclude state’s that do not
have sufficient wind potential for commercial wind production. (See (DOE, WPA) for information on each state’s
commercial scale wind development potential.)4
context of existing market constraints.  Lastly, my project expands the set of policies that are
studied.
3
Building on the work of Menz and Vachon (2006), Carley (2009) also provides an
empirical analysis of the impact of renewable energy policies, including RPS.  Her focus,
however, is on renewable electricity generation rather than wind capacity.  Sine and Lee (2008)
also empirically examined the role of policies on wind energy development.  However, their
focus was on predicting the number of wind energy projects that were registered with the Federal
Energy Regulation Commission (FERC) between 1978 and 1992.  Though the authors’ focused
on the wind energy market, their goal in identifying the determinants of development in the early
stages of the wind market are quite distinct from the focus of my project.  It is interesting to note
that they do find that state regulations generally had an impact in terms of wind development
during the nascent years of the wind energy market.  My project extends this analysis on the role
of policies in the development of the wind industry beyond its initial establishment as a market,
during a time of rapid expansion both within and across states.  Overall, while there has been
some descriptive work on the role of markets and policies in determining the amount of wind
development in the United States and some empirical work on the role of regulations in wind
development, this project is the first to synthesize the role that prices and policies played in
influencing the growth of the U.S. wind industry during the time when it was expanding
nationwide.
Background
Wind energy development is motivated by a complex set of factors.  It is determined in
part by the need to find renewable energy sources in the face of declining fossil fuel resources.  It
3 See the Data Section for a complete description of each renewable policy.5
is also propelled by increasing concerns over climate change and the desire to implement energy
production technologies that do not add additional carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.  Due to
the lower cost of wind compared with other renewable energy sources, particularly solar, wind
has become the dominant non-hydrogen renewable energy source.
Wind is an abundant renewable energy resource in the United States.  It is estimated that
wind energy could supply 20% of the electricity in the United States.  (Elliott, Wendell, and
Glower, 1991, p. v)  This estimate is derived from wind potential estimates produced by  the
Pacific Northwest Laboratory in 1991.
4 (Elliott, Wendell, and Glower, 1991)  While these
statistics are only theoretically feasible and are constrained by a set of assumptions including the
absence of transmission limitations, they do demonstrate the abundance of wind resources in the
United States.  To emphasize the theoretically feasible supply of wind energy in the U.S., it is
often noted that “the wind potential of just three states – North and South Dakota and Texas –
could supply all the country’s electricity.” (Gipe, 1995, p. xiii-xiv)  The impressive U.S. wind
potential findings in this 1991 report are reinforced by a new 2010 wind potential study.  The
wind potential estimates in the new report exceed those presented previously due to
improvements in wind technology.  Due in part to this vast potential wind development has been
increasing significantly in recent years.
History of Wind Development in the United States
Commercial wind development in the United States began in the 1980s.  It was the first
time in U.S. history that wind energy projects included multiple wind turbines sited together
rather than implementing a single turbine at each site. (Gipe, 1995, p.13)  It was during this time
that the notion of a wind farm developed.  The impetus for wind development was the same as
4 Wind potential calculations indicate the amount of wind that a state or region is theoretically capable of producing
under a specific set of assumptions.6
that for all renewable energy, a “scramble to develop alternative energy after the oil embargoes
of the 1970s.” (Gipe, 1995, p.2)  This initial commercial wind development in the 1980s was
limited to a few states, primarily California.
5  The mid-1980s represented the first peak in wind
development  This peak however pales in comparison to the growth in wind capacity that has
been seen since then.
 6,7
The growth of wind energy development in the United States since the 1980s has been a
tale of two decades.  A lull in the early 1990s was followed by a period of significant increase in
wind capacity additions beginning in the late 1990s.
8 (AWEA, projects db)  By 2000, wind
projects were dramatically increasing in size compared with their 1980s counterparts.  Total
wind capacity was also increasing, by 2003 U.S. wind energy capacity had maintained an
average annual growth rate of 24.5 percent for the previous five years and as of 2005 the United
States was the worldwide leader in wind capacity additions. (WPO, 2003, p.2)   This trend
continued through 2008, which proved to be a record year.  “Wind installations in 2008 were not
only the largest on record in the U.S., but were more than 60% higher than the previous U.S.
record, set in 2007.” (WPO, 2008, p. 3)
While wind projects have been sprouting up throughout the United States, the increase in
U.S. wind capacity is not matched by a correspondingly dramatic increase in terms of renewable
electricity production from wind.  Wind power  in 1999 provided less than 1% of total U.S.
electricity. (GWEMR,  1999, p. 1) This remained true though 2006 and by 2008  wind generated
5 According to the AWEA projects database Minnesota had one small wind project, < 1 MW in 1987.  All other
wind projects prior to 1992 were in California.
6 The 1980s peak coincided with the expiration of federal energy tax credits in 1985 and California state energy tax
credits which also expired in the mid-1980s.
7 Capacity, measured in megawatts, is the amount of power that a wind turbine is capable of producing. (Gipe 1995,
p.9)  To determine a state’s capacity, individual turbine capacities are first summed for each wind project and then
the project wind capacities are added to determine a state and year wind capacity measure.
8 Wind capacity in this paper is measured in two different ways, wind capacity additions and cumulative  wind
capacity.  Wind capacity additions are the megawatts of wind capacity that are added in each state and year.
Cumulative wind capacity is the total available wind capacity for each state and year.7
only 1.25% of the nation’s electricity. (WPO,  2006, p. 1; AWEA, AWIR, p.2)  Despite this
small increase in the percentage of total electricity generated from wind, it has made inroads in
terms of new generating capacity.  From 2000 to 2004 wind contributed only 4 percent of all new
electricity generating capacity in the United States (Wiser and Bolinger 2009, p. iii)  Since then
there has been a steady rise.  In 2005, wind’s contribution increased to 12 percent.  For 2006, it
rose again to 18 percent. (Wiser and Bolinger 2009, p. iii)  Subsequently, for 2007 and 2008, the
rise was dramatic, in 2007 and 2008 wind accounted for 35 percent and 42 percent of new
electricity generating capacity. (Wiser and Bolinger 2009, p. iii)  In fact, 2008 was the fourth
consecutive year when wind power was second only to natural gas in terms of electricity
generating capacity added. (Wiser and Bolinger 2009, p. iii)
To understand the factors that are leading to this increased development I provide a
theoretical framework which models a robust set of policy and market factors which may have
influenced wind development.  This framework includes both sides of the wind energy market,
wind producers and wind energy consumers.
Theoretical Framework
I base the theoretical framework on the standard economic supply and demand model.  In
this case, the supply side is determined by wind producers who provide the available wind
energy for wind generated electricity, while the demand side is driven by electricity producers
who demand renewable electricity.
Supply
The supply side focuses on a profit maximizing wind developer such that firms produce
the profit maximizing level of wind energy for wind generated electricity.  For the j-th producer:
qj = g(xj,yj) (1)8
Wind energy for wind generated electricity output, qj, is expressed as a function of wind inputs,
including wind capacity, xj, and an additional composite input, yj, that includes direct wind
project inputs such as capital and labor.  The output is determined by a production function that
varies across firms. For the j-th profit maximizing producer:
ߨ௝ =p ୵ g ൫ x ୨ ,y ୨൯–(w ୡെR ୡെ￿FIୡ)x୨ + (w୷ െR ୷െ FI୷)y୨￿ (2)
Output price, pw, is the price received for the sale of the wind generated electricity to electricity
producers.  Given the small influence of wind producers in the electricity market, producers will
take this price as given.  Input costs for capacity and other project inputs, wc and wy, are
influenced by a set of regulations, R,  and financial incentives, FI that are designed to increase
wind capacity by reducing costs.  Regulations and financial incentives can be directly focused on
increasing wind capacity, ܴ௖ and ܨܫ௖, or on indirectly increasing wind capacity by providing
direct incentives for capital and labor inputs for wind project development, ܴ௬ and ܨܫ௬.
Producer j develops some level of wind capacity J ൑ N, where N is the total wind potential
available.
Solving the standard profit maximizing model leads to some important implications



























Wind capacity will decrease as costs increase and increase as regulations or financial incentives
that promote renewables development increase.  The influence of other costs and regulations is
not clear in this case.  A similar case is found for the composite good.  In addition, it can be
shown that in terms of prices, an increase in the price for wind generated electricity will lead to9
either a direct increase in wind capacity or an increase in development inputs or both, but the
specific influence is not known given the standard profit maximization assumptions.
Demand
The demand side for wind generated electricity is determined by electricity producers
demand for renewable electricity.  For the k-th electricity producer :
ܳ௞ = ݂(ܲ ௪,ܳ௘,ܲ ௖￿,ܲ ௡௚,ܶ) (3)
The quantity of wind generated electricity, ܳ௞, that is demanded is a function of the price of
wind generated electricity,ܲ ௪, the total quantity of electricity produced,ܳ௘, the price of
substitute fuels, coal,ܲ ௖, and natural gas,ܲ ௡௚, and the preferences of consumers for renewable
electricity, ܶ.  The quantity varies by state, i, and year, t.  Electricity producer k consumes some
level of wind energy for wind generated electricity K ൑ M, where M is the total wind energy that
has been produced.
Assuming that wind generated electricity is a normal good, I expect that increases in ܲ ௪
will lead to decreased demand for wind generated electricity.  Given that wind generated
electricity is a component of total electricity, increases in ܳ௘ are expected to lead to increases in
demand for wind generated electricity.  Under the assumption that wind generated electricity and
electricity generated from traditional fuels are substitutes, I expect an increase in either ܲ ௖ or ܲ ௡௚
to lead to increases in demand for wind generated electricity.  Lastly, I anticipate that an increase
in preferences for wind generated electricity, ܶ, will lead to increased demand.
Reduced Form
The reduced form approach that I present below allows me to estimate the relationship
between wind capacity and the relevant independent variables without necessitating a measure of10
the price of wind generated electricity.
9  The reduced form of the model, for a given level of
wind potential is:
10
ܹ݅݊݀ܥܽ݌ܽܿ݅ݐݕௌ௨௣௣௟௬೔೟ =ߙ ଵ+ߙଶܲ ௪௧￿+ߙଷܹ ௧+ߙସܴ ௜௧ + ߙହܨܫ௜௧ +߳௜௧






￿[(ߙଶߚଵ െ ߙଵߚଶ) + ߙଶߚଷܳ௘௜௧ + ߙଶߚସܲ ௖௜௧ +ߙଶߚ ହܲ ௡௚௜௧ + ߙଶߚ଺ܶ௜௧ െ ߙଷߚଶܹ௧
െ ߙସߚଶܴ௜௧ െ ߙହߚଶܨܫ௜௧]
where, based on the theoretical model:
ߙଶ > 0,ߙଷ < 0,ߙସ > 0,ߙହ >0
ߚ ଶ< 0,ߚଷ > 0,ߚସ > 0,ߚହ > 0,ߚ଺ >0
Based on the equilibrium equation, this implies that the expected coefficient onܹ ௧ is
negative, increases in wind project costs will lead to decreases in wind capacity. The expected
coefficients on the remaining variables, ܳ௘௜௧, ܴ௜௧, ܨܫ௜௧, ܲ ௖௜௧, ܲ ௡௚௜௧,and ܶ௜௧ are positive.  Increases
in the quantity of electricity, prices of substitute fuels, renewable energy regulations and
financial incentives, and preferences for renewable energy will all lead to increased wind
capacity.
9 The annual price or electricity by state is available from the Energy Information Association (EIA), the statistics
arm of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), but the price of  wind generated electricity is not separately tracked
by the EIA annually over this time.
10 In the empirical analysis, wind potential will be included as a control through the construction of the dependent
variable.  The dependent variable that is analyzed is the annual states wind capacity divided by the state’s wind
potential.
11Where ܲ ௪௧￿= Price of Wind generated electricity/Renewable Electricity; ܹ ௧= Project costs; ܴ௜௧ = Regulation;
ܨܫ௜௧ = Financial Incentives; ܳ௘௜௧= Quantity of electricity produced; ܲ ௖௧ = Price of Coal; ܲ ௡௚௜௧= Price of Natural Gas;
ܶ௜௧ = Tastes
12 For the analysis, I use annual coal prices rather than annual state coal prices so that the analysis focuses on the
overall influence of coal prices on electricity including states for which no state coal prices are available, such as
California.11
Data
To complete the analysis, my project uses data from three main categories.  First wind
measures, both wind potential and wind capacity, second renewable energy policy indicators,
and third relevant electricity market factors.  I discuss each of these categories and the
corresponding constructed variables in more detail below.  The goal of this paper is to determine
the wind development impacts of both financial incentives and regulations after controlling for a
variety of market factors that  may have influenced wind development.  The time period  for this
analysis covers the years 1994 through 2008, a period of rapid growth in wind development and
also a time of rapid change in terms of both the regulatory environment and energy market.
While the dramatic rise in commercial scale development did not occur until about 1998,
1994 represents the first year when a state other than California implemented projects of greater
than 1 MW with the exception of two projects in Hawaii in the 1980s.
13 (AWEA, projects db)
Given that other states were participating in commercial wind development prior to 1998, I feel
that it is important to consider prior years when commercial scale wind was beginning its
expansion across the United States.  Figure 1 demonstrates the marked 1998 increase in wind
development and its more marginal rise beginning in 1994.
13 See Figure 1 for a graph of U.S. Wind Capacity from 1994 through 2008.
Commercial scale development began in Hawaii in 1985, in Iowa in 1992 and prior to 1985 in California.  Hawaii
and Alaska are excluded from this analysis, which focuses on the contiguous United States do to availability of wind
potential estimates.12
Figure 1:  U.S. Cumulative Wind Capacity and Added Capacity by Year
Source: (AWEA, projects db)
In addition to determining the time frame for analysis, it is also important to establish the
sample states for inclusion in the analysis.  For this project, the wind potential of a state was the
determining factor.  Wind potential is a set of measures that provide information on the amount
of wind that a state would be capable of producing.  A key reason that wind potential was a
constraining factor in sample definition is that the policies that I analyzed are not wind specific,
they are focused on renewables generally.  In particular, states with RPS, but with zero wind
potential are excluded from the analysis.  While RPS in these states may influence renewables
development generally, it would not be expected to lead to increases in wind generating capacity
within the state.
14
14 The cross-state impacts of RPS programs are not analyzed in this paper.  While some RPS do allow for the
importation of wind development from other states, this analysis focuses only on within-state impacts.13
To construct the sample, I used two measures of wind potential.  First, I used the measure
of wind potential constructed in 1991.
15  (Elliot, 1991, p. B-1)   Second, I use the updated 2010
wind potential measurements constructed by NREL. (NREL, AWS) The two measures differ
based on technological and land use assumptions.
16  They provide different wind potential
ratings for each state.  I used the information from both wind potential studies for my project to
identify which states would be included in the sample.  The sample of states is based on the top
20 states using the 1991 and 2010 wind potential ratings.  Due to overlap this led to a sample of
25 states, which are the same states as the top 25 states using the 2010 potential ratings.  Figure 2
contains the wind potential rankings by state for the sample states using the 1991 potential
information.
15 The 1991 measure was for the contiguous U.S., excluding Hawaii and Alaska.
16 For instance, the 1991 measure was constructed at 50m due to the availability of wind technology at the time,
while the 2010 measure was constructed at 80m.
The 1991 measure that I used was developed by the Pacific Northwest Laboratory under a scenario that all areas
with class 3 or higher wind resources were developed.  Further, certain lands that were unlikely to be developed
were excluded such as lands that were protected due to environmental concerns, in certain urban, forested, or
agricultural setting.  This is referred to as scenario 3. (Elliott, 1991, p. B-1)14
Figure 2:  Wind Potential by State
There are two wind potential measures for the 1991 and 2010 models, potential installed
capacity in megawatts and potential annual generation in gigawatt-hours.  “The ‘Installed
Capacity’ shows the potential megawatts (MW) of rated capacity that could be installed on the
available windy land area, and the ‘Annual Generation’ shows annual wind energy generation in
gigawatt-hours (GWh) that could be produced from the installed capacity.”
 17 (NREL, AWS) For
the analysis, I used the potential installed capacity by state because it is measured in megawatts
which corresponds to the wind capacity variable that is also measured in megawatts.
After establishing a sample time period and set of states, the most critical data for
analyzing wind development over this time period  is a measure of wind development.  For this
17 The installed capacity calculations are based on an assumption of 5 MW/km
2 of installed capacity.
The top 25 states in terms of both measures were identical.15
paper, I use added wind capacity by state and year for each state.
 18  At its most disaggregated
level, wind capacity is a measure in megawatts (MW) of the capacity rating of each turbine
installed at a wind project.  I collected the data for this research primarily from the AWEA wind
projects database.
19  The AWEA projects database reports wind capacity as a cumulative project
capacity.  The number reported is the turbine rating, the capacity rating of each turbine,
multiplied by the number of turbines for each project.  Using this information, I constructed a
state-year added capacity measure for use in the dependent variable.
20
In addition to wind capacity, I use 1991 wind potential to construct the dependent
variable.  The dependent variable is equal to the state-year wind capacity variable divided by the
state wind potential.  This provides a measure of the relative wind capacity in a state as
compared with its overall wind resource allotment.
21
Regulations and Financial Incentives
After the construction of the dependent variable for this analysis, I constructed the
regulatory variables, regulations and financial incentives.  This data set was based largely off of
information collected in the Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (DSIRE)
18 The current measures of wind potential are for the 48 –contiguous states only and therefore Hawaii and Alaska are
excluded from this analysis.
19 The AWEA contains commercial scale wind projects, generally over 100 kW.  “Commercial scale wind refers to
wind energy projects greater than 100 kW. Typically, the electricity is sold rather than used on-site. This category
can include large arrays of 100 or more turbines owned by large corporations or a single locally-owned wind turbine
greater than 100 kW in size.” (Windustry)
20 To create this variable, I began with data provided  by the DOE through NREL for the time period from 1999
through 2008 using data from the Global Energy Concepts (DNV-GEC) database which is jointly maintained by the
AWEA and made publicly available through AWEA as the AWEA projects database.  The database provided by the
AWEA contains information prior to 1999 and for the purposes of my project the added wind capacity measure was
constructed for the years from 1994 to 1998 so that a fifteen year sample is available for analysis.  This constructed
five year sample was then appended to the state-year cumulative capacity measures as presented by NREL.  There
are some discrepancies in the cumulative capacity information that is constructed prior to 1999 as detailed in
Appendix A, Table A2.
21 I also constructed an indicator for wind potential over time, wind potential interacted with year indicators, to
control for the potentially disparate impacts of wind potential on states over time.16
database.
 22  From this database, I used only those regulations and financial incentives that
focused on wind projects over 100 kW and that had been implemented prior to the end of 2008.
23
I restricted this set of data to include State Loan Programs and State Grant Programs from the set
of  state financial incentives.
24  In addition, I included the following state regulations, State
Green Power Purchasing/Aggregation (GPA), Renewables Portfolio Standards
25 (RPS), and
Mandatory Green Power Option Programs (MGPP).  In addition to these state specific measures,
I also constructed a measure of the Federal Production Tax Credit (PTC).
26
To supplement the regulation information provided in the DSIRE database, I used data
from the Green Pricing, Utility Programs by State information that is provided by the
Department of Energy, Energy and Efficiency Program to construct a Green Power Purchasing
Option Programs (GPP) indicator.
27  I include details on the sample data that I used to construct
measures for each of these policies in Tables 1-5.  Below I provide a detailed description of each
policy.
State Loan and Grant Programs
The state grant and loan programs in this analysis were those that provided financial
support for the development of commercial scale wind projects.  The programs were not
generally wind specific and instead targeted increases in renewable energy in their respective
22 The copy of the DSIRE database that my project for this analysis contained updates though August 2009 and was
obtained in September 2009 as an MS Access database.  The database “is a comprehensive source of information on
state, local, utility, and federal incentives and policies that promote renewable energy and energy efficiency.
Established in 1995 and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy, DSIRE is an ongoing project of the North
Carolina Solar Center and the Interstate Renewable Energy Council.” (DSIRE)
23 If a financial incentive or regulation expired in a given year, it was coded as active for that year.  If a financial
incentive or regulation began in November or December of a given year, it was coded as active for the following
year.  I coded all other financial incentives as active in the year in which they were implemented.
24 Given the limited number of programs, I combined both state grant and loan programs into a single variable for
the purposes of this analysis.
25 I verified all information on Renewables Portfolio Standards using information from Wiser and Barbose (2008).
26 Information on the Production Tax Credit in the DSIRE database was supplemented using information from
Wiser, Bolinger, and Barbose (2007).
27 See (Green Power Markets).17
states through financing options that were intended to make the projects more attractive to
developers.
28  The loan programs generally offer below market interest rates for funding of
renewable development, while the grant programs provide funds outright to encourage
renewables projects.
29
An example of a loan program is Iowa’s Alternative Energy Revolving Loan Program
(AERLP), which provides loans for the construction of renewable energy production projects in
Iowa.  The program began in 1996 with a limit of $1 million dollars per organization and a 20
year maximum term per loan which was interest free for 50% of the loan with the remainder
provided by a lender at a market rate.  (DSIRE, Iowa)  The program continues presently and was
expanded in 2009.  An application is required, the deadlines for application vary by the size of
the project.  This loan program has been successful.  “As of March 2009, the AERLP had
provided loans of more than $11.4 million in support of 88 renewable energy projects.” (DSIRE,
Iowa)
Using information for each state, I constructed three indices for state loan and grant
programs.  The first is an indicator variable, indicator index, that is set to one in the years in
which the first loan or grant program was enacted in a given state.  The second, the sum index, is
the sum of the active loan or grant programs in a given year for each state.  And the third, the
years from index, is the number of years from the first active loan or grant program in each
state.
30  Table 1 contains information on the years in which a state or loan program became
28 The terms of the loan and grant programs varied, but all required an application and award process for the
projects.  The inclusion of a project in this sample is restricted only by the years in which the programs were active,
but not by whether wind or other developers utilized the programs or whether the programs were successful.
29 It should be noted that states that offer financial incentives to encourage wind project development generally
structure their policies so as to allow the use of the financial incentives in conjunction with the federal PTC, so that
the implementation of these policies is not exclusive but rather complementary. (Wiser, Bolinger, and Barbose
,2007, p. 10-11)
30 All variables are zero in years in which no program has started and are set to zero once a program or in the case of
the sum index, all programs have expired.18
active and expired by state.  It is clear from Table 1 that there is considerable variation in the
timing of the implementation of these programs.
Table 1: State Loan and Grant Programs by Year Effective
Year Effective
State Program Expiration
2002 California State  Loan  Program  2003
2007 Colorado State Grant Program
1996 Iowa State Loan Program
1983, 1989, 1994, 2007 Minnesota  State  Loan  Program
1989 Missouri State Loan Program
2001 Montana State Loan Program
2004 New Mexico State Grant Program 2005
2001 New York State Loan Program
1999 Ohio State Grant Program
2002 Ohio State  Loan  Program  2007
1980 Oregon State Loan Program
1988 Texas State Loan Program
2002 Wisconsin  State  Grant  Program
Source: DSIRE database
Note: The table includes expiration dates only if they are within the sample time frame. (Prior to 2009)
Green Power Purchasing Option
In addition to offering financial incentives states have implemented regulations that
support the development of renewable energy.  GPP are a popular program across states.  These
programs offer consumers the opportunity to increase the amount of renewable electricity that is
generated through payment of an additional fee on their utility bill.  The amount of the fee and
the specific rules of the programs vary, but the additional funds are utilized to provide an
offsetting amount of renewable energy generation in the amount of the customer’s overall energy
use.  While not a direct purchase of renewable energy, the programs are designed to increase the
overall amount of renewable electricity generation.
These programs are implemented by utilities and therefore each state can have multiple
programs starting in different years providing variation for analysis.  One example, in Colorado
in 1997 the Public Service Company of Colorado, the state’s largest utility, offered a green19
pricing option to its customers.  The consumers could buy 100 kilowatthour (kWh) blocks of
renewable energy for a premium of 2.5 cents per kWh. (Green Power Markets) Other programs
were subsequently offered in Colorado by other utilities.
To encourage the development of GPP programs states have also stepped in and
mandated that utilities offer a green power option to their customers.  These Mandatory Utility
Green Power Option (MGPP) programs are also analyzed in this paper to determine the
potentially disparate impacts of state programs directed at utilities and utility programs offered
directly to consumers.  Table 2 presents a list of the total number of active GPP offered by
utilities in each state along with a list of states that have implemented mandates requiring that
utilities offer these programs.
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Table 2: Green Power Purchasing Option Programs





1997, 1999, 2000(2), 2003,
2004(3), 2006, 2008 California 10
1997(2), 1998, 1999(3), 2007,
2008 Colorado 8 2007
2001, 2002, 2003(2) Idaho 4
1997, 2000, 2003, 2005 Illinois 4
1998, 2000, 2001 Indiana 3
1998, 2000(2), 2001(2), 2003(5),
2004(2), 2006(1) Iowa 13 2004
2000(2), 2004, 2005, 2007 Michigan 5
1998(3), 1999, 2000(2), 2002(5),
2003(1) Minnesota 12 2001
2000(2), 2003, 2007 Missouri 4
2000, 2001, 2002(2), 2003(2) Montana 6 2003
2001, 2002 Nebraska 2
1999, 2001, 2003(2), 2005 New Mexico 5 2003
1999, 2000, 2002 North Dakota 3
2000, 2001, 2003, 2007, 2008 Ohio 5
2003(2), 2004(2) Oklahoma 4
1999(2), 2000, 2001, 2002(5),
2003(3), 2004, 2005, 2007(3) Oregon 17 2007
31 Note:  Mandates do vary in terms of which utilities are required to provide a green power option.  For some states,
the mandates focus on all Investor Owned Utilities (IOUs), for others the requirement only affects utilities of a
certain size, i.e. with a customer base over some minimum number of individuals.20





2000, 2001, 2002 South Dakota 3
1997, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2006 Texas 5
2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005 Utah 5
1999(2), 2000(2), 2001, 2002(8),
2003(2), 2005, 2007 Washington 17 2001
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000,
2001, 2002 Wisconsin 7
1999, 2000(2),  2001, 2003, 2006  Wyoming 6
Source: Green Power Markets and DSIRE db
Note: Kansas, Maine, New York do not have Green Power Option Programs.
Note: The table includes expiration dates only if they are within the sample time frame, prior to 2009, no Green Power Purchase
Option Programs expired during that time frame.
For this analysis, I constructed three separate variables for the GPP. The indicator, sum,
and years from indices.  In addition, I constructed indicator and years from indices for the
MGPP.
Renewables Portfolio Standards
It is clear from the Table 2 that utility GPP programs are prevalent across states.  Another
widely discussed and popular state program is the Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS).
Fundamentally, an RPS is a requirement that the utilities in a state produce a certain amount of
electricity using renewable energy sources.  The amount of electricity generation that must be
supplied from renewables varies in percentage and in the year of required implementation. See
Table 3 for detailed information.21









California 20% by 2010 Montana 15% by 2015
Colorado 20% by 2020 New Mexico 20% by 2020
Illinois (Optional)
(5% by 2010 and 15% by
2020) New York 24% by 2013
Illinois 25% by 2025 North  Dakota (Optional)  10% by  2015
Iowa 105 MW by 1999 Oregon 5-25% by 2025
Maine 30% by 2000 South  Dakota (Optional)  10% by  2015
Michigan 10% by 2015 Texas 5880 MW by 2015
Minnesota
a 825 MW by 2002 Utah (Optional) 20% by 2025
Minnesota  (Optional)  10%  by  2015 Washington 15% by 2020
Minnesota 25-30% by 2020-2025 Wisconsin 10% by 2015
Missouri  (Optional)  11%  by  2020
a: This RPS legislation was focused only on Xcel Energy. It is scheduled to expire in 2010. The mandatory RPS does not apply to
Xcel Energy until 2010.
Source: DSIRE database and Wiser et al 2007 p. 7
In addition to this variation, across states these policies vary in their requirements for
implementation of intermediate renewable mandates prior to the reaching of the final goal and by
the mix of renewables that are required.  Additionally some states require newly developed
renewable generation, generally put into production after 1999 and some require that the
generation take place within the state while others do not. (Wiser et al 2007, p.6)
 Despite the variation in implementation, given the common focus of these policies, for
this analysis the RPS will be treated as a single policy instrument.  An exception will be made
for those RPS that are not mandated.  I expect that the impacts on wind development from a
legally mandated RPS requirement will be stronger than for those in which the percentage of
renewable electricity generation is an optional standard for utilities.
RPS are widely touted as critical factors for renewable energy development and in
particular wind energy development. (RPS 2007, p.2, WPO 2005, p.2)  This general finding is22
noteworthy given that the design and components contained in each RPS vary across states and
time.  It is also a strong conclusion given that RPS are often non-binding constraints since the
year for the implementation of the final renewable generation  requirement is outside the sample
time frame.
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For this analysis, I constructed separate variables for optional RPS and mandatory RPS
by state and year of adoption.  See Table 4 for information by state on the implementation of
RPS.
32 Some states have instituted mandatory interim requirements which may have been binding over the sample time
frame.23
Table 4: Renewables Portfolio Standards
Year Effective State Program Expiration
2003 California Renewables Portfolio Standard
2005 Colorado Renewables Portfolio Standard
2001 Illinois Optional Renewables Portfolio Standard
2007 Illinois Renewables Portfolio Standard
1983 Iowa Renewables Portfolio Standard
2000 Maine Renewables Portfolio Standard
2008 Michigan Renewables Portfolio Standard
1995 Minnesota Renewables Portfolio Standard
a
2001 Minnesota Optional Renewables Portfolio Standard 2007
2007 Minnesota Renewables Portfolio Standard
2007 Missouri Optional Renewables Portfolio Standard
2005 Montana Renewables Portfolio Standard
2003 New  Mexico  Renewables  Portfolio  Standard
2004 New York Renewables Portfolio Standard
2007 North Dakota Optional Renewables Portfolio Standard
2007 Oregon Renewables Portfolio Standard
2008 South Dakota Optional Renewables Portfolio Standard
1999 Texas Renewables Portfolio Standard
2008 Utah Optional Renewables Portfolio Standard
2006 Washington  Renewables  Portfolio  Standard
1999 Wisconsin Renewables Portfolio Standard
a:  This RPS legislation was focused only on Xcel Energy. It is scheduled to expire in 2010. The mandatory RPS does not apply
to Xcel Energy until 2010.
I used the date enacted for the RPS as the basis for analysis.  Additionally, I constructed
two variables to represent both optional and mandatory RPS, the indicator index and the years
from index.  While RPS like any regulation is not stagnant, a more in depth investigation of the
changes in RPS over time is left for future work.  Table 4 presents RPS by state and year of
implementation for the 25 states included in the sample.
33
33 The years listed are the years when the RPS was enacted.  For some states there may be several years between the
date the RPS is enacted and the date in which utilities are required to use produce electricity from renewables.  It is
expected that the enactment of an RPS could spur development to meet future goals even if the RPS mandates are
not binding.24
State Green Power Purchasing/Aggregation
Another program that has been implemented by states is the Green Power Purchasing
Programs (GPA), which outline specific goals for the state government in terms of renewable
energy use.  Table 5 includes a list of states that have implemented such programs.










Note: The table includes expiration dates only if they are within the sample time frame. (Prior to 2009)
One example of a GPA is from the state of Illinois.  “In January 2007, the State of Illinois
established a goal for state agencies to purchase 3% of their power from renewable sources by
the end of 2007, 4% by the end of 2008, and 5% by the end of 2009.” (DSIRE, IL)  These
programs provide a direct incentive for renewables development by  mandating that the
government go green.  For the purposes of this analysis, I will focus only on state level
purchasing programs, however the implementation of these programs extends beyond the state to
both municipal governments and the federal government.  A more detailed analysis of the
impacts of all green power purchasing programs and their relationship with other state
renewables programs will be completed in future work.
Given the lag between enactment of legislation and implementation, for the purposes of
this analysis, the effective date of  legislation is used for analysis as opposed to the enacted date.
I constructed two variables to represent GPA programs, the indicator index and the years from
index.25
Federal Production Tax Credit
Along with state regulations and financial incentives, this paper also analyzes the PTC.
In addition to RPS, the PTC is often cited as critical for wind development.  The PTC is an
inflation adjusted business tax credit that applies to electricity generated from commercial wind
projects for the first ten years after they are developed and reduces the cost of producing wind by
about a third.
34 (Wiser, 2007)  The goal of the PTC is to offset energy credits already in place for
other energy sources due to the environmental and energy security benefits of wind energy.
(Wiser, Bolinger, and Barbose, 2007, p.2)  The credit was originally created under the Energy
Policy Act of 1992, but has been allowed to expire several times since its inception. (Wiser,
Bolinger, and Barbose, 2007, p. 1-2)  Its lapses over the years are correlated with decreases in
wind capacity additions and are often blamed for those declines.  In 2005 the AWEA argued
“that the current ‘on-again, off-again’ status of the credit is hobbling project development and
the industry as a whole.” (AWEA, EoWE, p. 4)
For the purposes of this analysis, I constructed a binary PTC variable with a 1 indicating
that the PTC was active for a given year and a 0 indicating that it had lapsed for some time
during the year.  One exception to this construction is that although the PTC was allowed to
lapse in 1999, the impacts of this lapse are conventionally attributed to 2000 due to the lag time
for development.  I followed this convention in this  paper.  Therefore, I constructed the PTC
indicator variable with a zero for the years 2000, 2002, and 2004.
Market Factors
After the construction of the policy indicators, I constructed the variables to measure the
electricity market impacts.  I collected total electricity generation information from annual state
data provided by the Energy Information Association (EIA) from 1998-2008 as the measure of
34 The initial credit was 1.5c/kWh and was directed towards wind plants that were to come online between 1994 and
the middle of 1999.  By 2007, the value of the tax credit had increased to 2.0 c/kWh due to inflation adjustments.26
total quantity of electricity produced. (REA, 2000 – 2008)  I also constructed price variables for
natural resources used in electricity generation, natural gas and coal.
35  To construct the natural
gas price measure, I collected data by state and year of commercial natural gas price from the
EIA. (EIA, Gas Price)  For coal prices, I constructed an annual measure due to the fact that
information on the average price of coal delivered to electric utility plants by state was not
available for all states.
36 (EIA, Coal Price)  Natural gas and coal are substitute goods in terms of
fuel for electricity production.  Increases in prices of these substitute goods would be expected to
lead to increases in demand for alternative fuel sources, including wind.  Also, the volatility of
natural gas prices is an oft cited reason for increases in renewables development generally.
(WPO,  2005, p. 4)  Figure 3 contains average annual real resource prices for the United States.
35 All prices and well costs are real prices, in chained (2000) U.S. dollars, calculated by using gross domestic
product price deflators from the EIA.
36 For states in which coal is not delivered or used in electric utility plants, the price information is missing.  These
states include California, Idaho, Maine, and Washington.  For Washington the price data is missing from 2001
through 2008.27
Figure 3:  Electricity Fuel Prices
The graph above demonstrates that over this time period, from 1994-2008, prices have
been increasing for the United States for both resources.  This upward trend in the price of fossil
fuels could be motivating electricity producers to look for alternative fuel sources.  This analysis
will test the impact that these rising resource prices are having on wind development.
Wind Costs and Turbine Size
As far back as 1989, cost estimates for wind power have been estimated to be in line with
conventional sources and were predicted to fall further. (Gipe, p. 226) The AWEA argued in
2002 that the “cost of wind power at efficient wind farms has declined to a range that is close to
competitive with several forms of conventional power and less expensive than nuclear.”
(GWEMR,  2002, p.7) This is consistent with the argument put forward by Wiser (2007) that
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wind a cost effective source of energy. (Wiser, March 29, 2007)  The decline in costs is shown in
Figure 4.
37
Figure 4:  Project Costs and Turbine Size
Source: Turbine Size- AWEA projects database, Cost – Berkeley Labs email from Mark Bollinger 03/10
Costs have had an overall decreasing trend until 2008 when prices began to rise above the
1994 levels.  Average costs were approximately $3500 per kilowatt in 1985 and had fallen to just
over $1700 per kilowatt by 1994.  By 2008, the average costs had increased to just over $1900
per kilowatt, still only approximately 55% of the 1985 costs. (Wiser and Bolinger, 2009, p. 33)
Due to these significant changes, falling costs are expected to play a role in the amount of wind
capacity that is added.
38
37 The project costs in the graph above include  “turbine purchase and installation, balance of plant, and any
substation and/or interconnection expenses.”  (2008 Market Report, p. 33)
38 In addition to direct costs, financing and transmissions costs may also play a role in wind capacity additions.  I do
not include direct measures of financing or transmissions costs in the analysis, but I do include year indicator
variables to control for the overall influence of year specific variations.  While not a precise measure of changes in
these costs, the year indicators broadly include factors that influence wind capacity in each year.29
These costs declines have been caused in part by technological improvements in turbine
design.  Figure 4 shows that turbine size has been increasing over this time period and taller
towers and larger blades both lead to increases in production. (AWEA, EoWE, p. 1)  This is due
to the fact that wind speeds are higher as the distance from the ground is increased and larger
blades have a larger swept area. (AWEA, EoWE, p. 2) The increases in size of the individual
turbines and the addition of larger numbers of turbines per project also lead to decreased
marginal costs. (AWEA, EoWE, p.2)  This significant ramping up of turbine sizes is expected to
also play a role in determining wind capacity changes.  I constructed two variables, both annual
measures, of average project costs and average turbine size.
League of Conservation Voters Scores
The last factor that I have postulated will influence demand for wind generated electricity
is consumer tastes.  According to the theoretical framework, states with higher demand for
renewable energy will have higher levels of renewable development generally and wind
specifically.  The League of Conservation Voters (LCV) scores provide a rating for each state’s
Federal Senate and House delegation based on how the state’s Senators and Representatives
voted on key environmental legislation in the previous year. (LCV, Score)  The relevant
legislation is determined by experts from environmental organizations. The score is constructed
on a 0 to 100 scale for each legislator with 0 indicating that the legislator voted against
environmental legislation and a higher score indicative of a more environmentally friendly
legislator.  The legislators scores are then averaged across a state’s legislative delegation in the
Federal Senate and House by year.  My analysis uses these indicators of the overall
environmental friendliness of a state as an indicator of the willingness of a state’s population to30
demand wind development.  It is expected that states with higher LCV scores will have
additional wind development.
Empirical Framework
Based on the theoretical framework, I focus the empirical analysis on measuring the
influence of renewable energy policies on the growth in added wind capacity after controlling for
market factors and state wind potential.  The 25-state sample covers the time period from 1994
through 2008.
 39  This panel allows for the identification of impacts from the policy variables,
that change at most annually at the state level.  Given the distribution of the dependent variable a
random effects Tobit model was used.
40 Yit is censored at zero with approximately 40 percent of
the observations at zero.  See Figure 5 for a depiction of the dependent variable over time by
state.
39 Indiana is excluded from the results.  Due to a wind potential of only 30 MW, and an installed capacity in 2008 of
four times that amount, Indiana is an outlier.  The wind potential measure increased significantly under the 2010
model.  To avoid this anomaly in the wind potential data the regressions are run without Indiana.
The analyses were also run using electricity prices as an indicator of the influence of the electricity market,
the results regarding the market and policy variables were consistent in magnitude and sign to those presented here.
The electricity price variable was not consistently statistically significant.
40 I include a linear regression in Appendix A, Table A3 for comparison.  Also, the pooled Tobit regression
specification was tested against the random effects Tobit regression and the random effects Tobit regression was
found to provide a better fit.  Fixed effects Tobit was also considered, however, the fixed effects Tobit specification
is known to be biased.  For robustness, I ran linear fixed effects and random effects regressions and used a Hausman
test to determine if the more efficient random effects model was consistent with the fixed effects model.  The results
indicate that the linear random effects model is consistent.31
Figure 5:  Dependent Variable – Added Wind Capacity / Wind Potential by State
The specification of the model is:
ܻ ௜௧ =￿ן+ ߚ 1 ܳ ௘ ௜௧ + ߚ2ܲ ௖௧ +ߚ 3ܲ ௡௚௜௧ + ߚସܶ
݅ݐ + ߚ5ܹݐ + ߚ6ܴ݅ݐ + ߚ7ܨܫ݅ݐ + ߝ௜௧
where Y ~ (0, ¥)
and ߝ௜௧ = ߛ௜ + ߤ௜௧
where i = state and t = year. Yit represents the annual state wind capacity per state wind
potential.
The main regression results are presented in Tables 6-8, which vary based on the
regulatory variables that are included.  Tables 6 and 6a present results for the sum index, Table 7
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Source: AWEA Projects Databas/PNL-DOE
Wind Capacity (MW) / Wind Potential (MW) by State32
Table 6: Tobit Random Effects: Regulations and Market Influences
Regulatory and Financial Incentive Indicators:
Sum of Active Programs
Dependent Variable:  Annual





Full Sample with Year
Indicators
State Grant and Loan
Program(s)








Renewables Portfolio Standard 0.0101*** 0.0104***
(2.708) (2.765)
Utility Green Power Option(s)
a 0.00240*** 0.00227***
(5.961) (5.031)
Federal Production Tax Credit 0.00932*** 0.00220
(3.131) (0.203)
Commercial NG Price ($/Mcf) 0.00135* 0.00206*
(1.827) (1.834)
Real Coal Price -0.000108 -4.78e-05
(-0.197) (-0.0229)
Net Electricity Generation
(Thousands of Kilowatthours) 3.23e-08** 3.09e-08*
(2.014) (1.855)
Capacity-Weighted Average
Project Costs ($/KW) 5.04e-07 2.30e-05
(0.104) (0.663)













Number of States 24 24
Note: asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. ȡ is the percent contribution to the total
variance of the panel-level variance component. ıu: panel-level standard deviation; ıe: standard deviation of e_it.
a: These indices are the sum of active GPP programs and State Grant and Loan Programs in each state.33
Overall, the findings in Tables 6 through 8 indicate that the regulatory influences of the
PTC, RPS, GPP, and MGPP on wind capacity are consistently positive and statistically
significant.
41  In addition, the coefficient on Optional RPS was consistently not significant.  This
result is not unexpected for the Optional RPS, since it is a voluntary program.  These findings are
discussed in more detail below along with the remaining policy indicators that demonstrated
some statistical significance.  In terms of electricity market factors, there was some evidence of
significance for several measures, however, there is some variability in the individual results.
The market factors will be discussed in more detail below.
 42
Renewables Portfolio Standard
To begin the discussion of the regression results, I focus on two of the most widely
known and discussed renewable regulations, RPS and the PTC.  The AWEA has consistently
advocated for RPS as an important regulatory mechanism for supporting the growth of wind
energy.  The literature has generally supported the supposition that RPS lead to additional
renewable energy development. (Langniss and Wiser, 2003; Wiser, Porter, and Grace, 2004;
Wiser and Barbose, 2008; Menz and Vachon, 2006).  Counter to the largely descriptive literature
on renewable energy development, Carley (2009) finds that in terms of renewable electricity
generation, RPS are not statistically significant predictors.  The results in this paper support the
41 MGPP sum index is correlated with the GPP sum index at .66.  Due to this colinearity, the variables are not
included in the same regression.  The coefficient on the MGPP program, not shown in Tables 6 and 6a, was also
positive and statistically significant at the ten percent level if included without the GPP programs.
42 In addition to the market variables presented in the analysis, I also analyzed average turbine size as an indicator of
technological progress and it was consistently not statistically significant.  Also, to determine if there was a disparate
influence of wind potential over time, I analyzed a year-wind potential interaction, it was consistently not
statistically significant.  Lastly, I ran all of the analysis with an alternate dependent variable constructed with 2010
wind potential measures, the magnitude and sign of the coefficients was consistent with the results presented here.34
work that argues for RPS in positively influencing renewable energy development, in this case
wind development.
43
The results in Tables 6a and 7 demonstrate that the probability of wind development
occurring increases by between approximately 24 and 33 percent after the implementation of an
RPS.  In addition, given that wind development has occurred, the expected megawatts of wind
capacity per megawatt of wind potential increased by between approximately 0.3 and 0.5
percentage points.
43 The results regarding RPS were robust to the inclusion of year indicators.  See Table 20, column 2 for results
including year indicators.35
Table 6a: Tobit Random Effects: Regulations and Market Influences  - Sum Index
(Marginal Effects)
Regulatory and Financial Incentive Indicators:
Sum of Active Programs
 Dependent Variable:  Annual














State Grant and Loan
Program(s)








Renewables Portfolio Standard 0.239*** 0.00306**
(2.678) (2.427)
Utility Green Power Option(s)
a 0.0539*** 0.000652***
(5.652) (5.909)
Federal Production Tax Credit 0.188*** 0.00229***
(3.581) (3.461)
Commercial NG Price ($/Mcf) 0.0303* 0.000366*
(1.837) (1.835)
Real Coal Price -0.00242 -2.93e-05
(-0.197) (-0.197)
Net Electricity Generation
(Thousands of Kilowatthours) 7.25e-07** 8.77e-09**
(1.995) (2.013)
Capacity-Weighted Average
Project Costs ($/KW) 1.13e-05 1.37e-07
(0.104) (0.104)
LCV Scores (Senate) 0.00100 1.21e-05
(1.063) (1.068)
Observations 360 264
Number of States 24 24
Note: asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
a: These indices are the sum of active GPP programs and State Grant and Loan Programs in each state.  For other
programs, only one program was active in each state.36
Table 7: Tobit Random Effects: Regulations and Market Influences – Indicator Index
(Marginal Effects)
Regulatory and Financial Incentive Indicators:
Year of Initial Implementation
 Dependent Variable:  Annual




















Mandatory Utility Green Power
Option





Renewables Portfolio Standard 0.328*** 0.00472***
(4.189) (3.489)
Utility Green Power Option
a 0.271*** 0.00367***
(4.716) (4.413)
Federal Production Tax Credit 0.174*** 0.00231***
(3.511) (3.398)
Commercial NG Price ($/Mcf) 0.0263 0.000347
(1.524) (1.533)
Real Coal Price 0.00806 0.000106
(0.692) (0.692)
Net Electricity Generation
(Thousands of Kilowatthours) 5.62e-07 7.42e-09
(1.107) (1.115)
Capacity-Weighted Average
Project Costs ($/KW) -2.26e-05 -2.98e-07
(-0.215) (-0.214)
LCV Scores (Senate) 0.00102 1.34e-05
(0.941) (0.947)
Observations 360 360
Number of States 24 24
Note: asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
a: This index is an indicator of the first year for each effective program in each state and year for GPP and state
grant and loan programs.37
Table 8 demonstrates that these results are unexpectedly diminishing over time. These
findings are in contrast with those of Carley (2009) who found that the there was no initial effect
of an RPS on renewable electricity generation generally, but that its influence was increasing
over time.38
Table 8: Tobit Random Effects: Regulations and Market Influences (Marginal Effects)
Regulatory and Financial Incentive Indicators:
Years from Initial Implementation
Dependent Variable:  Annual








Expected Increase in Wind
Capacity Relative to a State’s
Wind Potential Given That Wind
Development Has Occurred





 a 0.0975*** 0.00129***
(3.362) (3.339)
Mandatory Utility Green Power
Option









Utility Green Power Option
a 0.0474*** 0.000625***
(4.390) (4.390)
Federal Production Tax Credit 0.175*** 0.00232***
(3.363) (3.278)
Commercial NG Price ($/Mcf) 0.0352** 0.000464**
(2.052) (2.042)
Real Coal Price -0.0201 -0.000265
(-1.506) (-1.508)
Net Electricity Generation













Number of States 24 24
Note: asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
a: This index is an indicator of the number of years from initial implementation for each type of regulatory program
and financial incentive in each state and year except the Federal Production Tax Credit.
Given that the binding constraints for the implementation of each RPS are outside of the
time period of analysis, I expected that the effectiveness of the RPS would increase rather than
decrease in the years subsequent to its implementation.  In fact, the influence of the RPS is39
diminished in the years after its implementation.  The magnitude of the negative influence in
each year after implementation is approximately 1.5 percentage points, significantly smaller than
the initial positive influence of the RPS.  This indicates that long term role of the RPS in
influencing continued wind development after its initial year of implementation is debatable.
The total long term influence cannot be determined until after the mandatory renewable energy
requirements of the RPS become binding.  The information in Table 3 shows that generally this
will occur in the next five to ten years.  While the initially positive influence of the RPS is
strongly demonstrated in these results, the fact that this influences diminishes in the years after
implementation make it difficult to conclude whether the long term role of the RPS will be
positive or not.  The final conclusions hinge on the long term influence of the RPS as they
become binding constraints.
Federal Production Tax Credit
The AWEA often argues for the importance of the PTC in influencing wind development
(AWEA, EoWE; GWEMR 1999).  The literature has generally supported this viewpoint, arguing
that the lapses in the PTC lead to decreases in wind development. (Bird et al, 2005; Harper,
Karcher, and Bolinger, 2007).  Evidence of correlation between the total amount of wind
capacity that is added in the United States and an active PTC are clear from Figure 2.  The
findings in this paper support the supposition of the AWEA and others regarding the significance
of the PTC in influencing added wind capacity.  The coefficient on the PTC is consistently
positive, and statistically significant.
The results in Tables 6a, 7, and 8 demonstrate that the probability of wind development
occurring increases by between approximately 17 and 19 percent with an active PTC.  In40
addition, given that wind development has occurred, the expected megawatts of additional wind
capacity per megawatt of wind potential increased by approximately 0.2 percentage points.
Green Power Purchasing Option Programs and Mandatory Green Power Option Programs
The role of RPS and the PTC are not the only widely discussed renewables programs, in
addition, GPP programs are widely popular.  The results in Table 7 show that after a state
implements a GPP program, the probability of wind development increases by 27 percentage
points.  In addition, given that wind development has occurred, a GPP program increases the
expected megawatts of wind capacity per megawatt of wind potential by 0.4 percentage points.
Table 6a shows that these findings are supported by the results for the GPP sum index.  The
results in Table 6a demonstrate that the probability of wind development increases by
approximately five percentage points after each GPP program is implemented in a state.  In
addition, for each program that is implemented, the expected megawatts of added wind capacity
per megawatt of wind potential increases by 0.07 percentage points.
44  Table 8 shows that the
findings are robust to the inclusion of the alternate, years from, index.  For each additional year
after the implementation of a GPP program, there is an approximately five percentage point
increase in the probability of wind development.  In addition, given that wind development has
occurred, there is an expected increase in the megawatts of added wind capacity per megawatt of
wind potential of approximately 0.06 percentage points.
Given the fact that multiple GPP programs are often implemented in a single state, it is
not possible to entirely separate out the effects of additional programs from the influence of the
initial program in the specifications in Table 8.  The fact that the significance of the GPP
44 The findings regarding the GPP sum index are robust to the inclusion of year indicators.  For the GPP indicator
index, however, the statistical significance is diminished to less than ten percent if year indicators are included.41
programs is robust for both the GPP sum and GPP years from indices does demonstrate the
important influence of these programs on increasing wind development.
The expected positive influence of the GPP programs has led some states to mandate
their implementation by utilities.  Tables 7 and 8 demonstrate the positive and statistically
significant influence of the MGPP programs.  The magnitude of the influence of the MGPP
index is less in terms of its initial influence as demonstrated in Table 7, but after its
implementation, its continued yearly influence is as strong as that of the GPP programs as
demonstrated in Table 8.  Given the role of the MGPP in generating GPP programs, it is not
surprising that the influence is stronger in the years after the implementation of a MGPP than it
is in its initial year of implementation.  Clearly, these programs, which allow for the direct
implementation of consumer demand for renewables, have played an important role in increasing
wind capacity across states.
Green Power Purchasing/Aggregation Programs
The last policy that I analyze are green power purchasing mandates for state
governments.  The findings in Tables 6 and 7 show that the implementation of a GPA program
does not have a statistically significant influence on wind development.  The findings in Table 8,
however, indicate that for each year after the implementation of the GPA program, there is a
positive and statistically significant influence on wind development.  States with a GPA will on
average have an increased probability of wind development of approximately 10 percentage
points.  In addition, for each year after the GPA program is adopted, there will be an increase in
the expected megawatts of wind capacity per megawatts of wind potential of approximately 0.01
percentage points.  This positive influence over the longer term could point to either a delay in
the adoption of the renewable energy to meet the goals of the GPA or influence of the state GPA42
on municipalities leading to municipal GPA implementation.  Future work will focus on
analyzing additional GPA programs.
Electricity Market Factors
The regression results in Tables 6 through 8 indicate the significance of various market
factors, including natural gas prices, and the total net electricity generation.  The findings,
however, are not robust to the inclusion of the alternate policy indices.  Interestingly, taken
together, the market factors are consistently jointly statistically significant.  This indicates that
there is an overall influence from the electricity markets after controlling for the regulatory
environment.
League of Conservation Voters Scores
The final factor that was considered was the role of consumer preferences for renewables
development.  As an indicator of consumer preferences by state, I analyzed LCV scores for both
the state Senate and House.  The state Senate score was consistently positive indicating that a
higher environmentally friendly state legislative delegation leads to additional wind capacity,
however, it was generally not statistically significant.
45  The limited influence of the LCV scores
could indicate that preferences are not a main factor in determining wind development.
Forthcoming work will analyze the role of alternative preference measures to determine if the
lack of statistical significance is due to the choice of indicator variable.
Conclusion
The findings in this paper demonstrate that both renewable energy regulations and the
electricity market influence added wind capacity increases in the United States.  The
45 The House LCV score was statistically significant at the ten percent level for both the sum and indicator indices,
but not for the years from index.  The magnitude of the coefficient was consistently not economically significant.
For a ten percentage point increase in the index, the probability of wind development increased by two percentage
points.43
implementation of the PTC, an RPS or a GPP program, either by a utility or a state mandate for
utilities, increased added wind capacity relative to a state’s wind potential.  The influence of the
GPP is increasing in the years after implementation, while for an RPS the effect diminishes in
the years after initial implementation.  State GPA programs also positively influenced wind
development, while State Loan and Grant programs were ineffective.
In terms of market factors, although no single electricity market indicator was
consistently statistically significant, taken together the electricity market did have a statistically
significant influence on wind development.  As expected, given the measures included, the
influence was positive.  Also, consumer preferences, as measured through LCV scores, did not
prove to be a significant factor in increasing wind development.
This paper demonstrates that while renewable energy regulations are not universally
significant in influencing wind development, they are having a positive influence in the wind
market.  The implementation of the PTC, an RPS or GPP programs in particular, lead to
increased added wind capacity.44
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Mean 336.4659 0.00367642 81919.81 7.397992 19.29364
Median 53 0 49470.85 7.41 18.21
Standard
Deviation 724.2453 0.0129579 82052.47 1.972993 2.98338
Maximum 7113 0.1144652 405492.3 13.42 26.62
















Mean 44.53409 40.95455 1471.997 1.087104 1.01 x10
08
Median 47 40.5 1439.52 1.1412 5.80 x10
07
Standard
Deviation 33.27896 25.8661 210.5465 0.401866 9.91 x10
07
Maximum 100 100 1915.41 1.795789 2.78x10
08
Minimum 0 0 1202.76 0.496061 819180
Note: All of the summary statistics in the Table above are for the 24 state sample.
Table A2:  Discrepancy between Cumulative Measures
State Discrepancy (MW) Percentage of 1999 Level





Table A3:  Linear Models
Dependent Variable:  Annual






State Grant and Loan
Program(s)








Renewables Portfolio Standard 0.00140 -0.00165
(0.369) (-0.312)
Utility Green Power Option(s)
a 0.0127* 0.00680*
(2.042) (1.871)
Federal Production Tax Credit 0.00333** 0.00320**
(2.772) (2.117)
Commercial NG Price ($/Mcf) 0.00245* 0.00227*
(1.963) (1.737)
Real Coal Price 8.18e-05 0.000389
(0.102) (0.527)


















Number of States 24 24
a: These indices are the sum of active GPP programs and State Grant and Loan Programs in each state.